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THE LEGACY OF JUDGE HOWARD

T. MARKEY

ANTONIN SCALIA *

I am here because I was a close friend of Howard Markey. And when I was
invited to participate in this symposium dedicated to him, to his legacy, I could
hardly say no. I am not here because I am an expert in patent law or in intellectual
property law; and hence, I am not here because I am among those most qualified to
evaluate his legacy, if that's what you think his legacy is. But let me talk about
Howard and about some of his work on the Federal circuit.
Howard, of course, was a successful lawyer before he went on the bench.' He
received his Master's Degree in patent law from this law school. 2 He practiced here
in Chicago for almost 25 years, becoming one of the leading patent law and
intellectual property law practitioners. 3 Later he became a respected and extremely
active jurist, sitting in over 5,000 cases on the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
and the Federal Circuit and sitting as a visiting judge in over 1,400 cases, both civil
and criminal, in every one of the Regional Circuit Courts. 4 He authored over 1,000
opinions, numerous articles on the law and delivered countless speeches and
lectures.5 He had a good Irishman's way with an after-dinner speech, as those who
know him will recall.
Howard was a judicial administrator. He served for 10 years as Chief Judge of
the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and then for eight years as
Chief Judge of the newly created Federal Circuit,6 getting it started on a sound
footing, designing its procedures and winning it acceptance as a respected part of the
Article III Judiciary. He was Chair of the Committee on Codes of Conduct, Chair of
the Science Advisory Committee of the Federal Judiciary Center, Chair of the Circuit
Chief Judges Conference and a member of numerous other committees and
7
conferences.
When the Federal Circuit was first created, skeptics questioned its staying
power.8 There was fear that other courts might resent their loss of jurisdiction over
matters entrusted exclusively to this new upstart circuit.9 And Chief Judge Markey
*

Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States.

1 See Sherman L. Cohn, Howard T. Markey, 1 J. FED. CIR. HIST. SOc'Y 7, 9 (2007).

2 ITd.
3 See id.
4 Id. at 10.

5 ITd.
6 Id.

at 9.

7 Id. at 10.

8 See Howard T. Markey, The FederalCircuit and CongressionalIntent,41 AM. U. L. REV. 577,
577 (1992) ("Those 'in at the creation' will recall the skeptics' predictions that the Federal Circuit
would be short-lived.").
9 S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 40 (1981), as reprintedin1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 49 (statement of Sen.
Baucus).
There are many portions of [the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982]
that I support and endorse as needed improvements in our federal judicial system.
However, I cannot support that portion of the legislation which would remove the
jurisdiction of all patent cases from the eleven federal circuit court [sic] of appeals.
I believe this provision will undermine the status of existing regional circuits, will
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himself noted the challenge of running a court with exclusive jurisdiction over areas
of law for which the court would not have the luxury of looking to its sister circuits
for guidance. 10
He was also aware that the absence of conflict with those sister circuits would
tend to insulate his court's opinions from further review." Those of you who know
much about Supreme Court practice know that the principal basis on which we grant
certiorari is not that the decision below was wrong. That is not the point at all. We
cannot correct all the mistakes. The principal criterion is that there be a circuit
conflict. 12 Howard realized that the absence of any circuit conflict in those areas over
which the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction means that to an unusual degree
the Federal Circuit's law-making is insulated from review. The Supreme Court
cannot say, well, we do not know whether it is right or wrong, but at least it
disagrees with this other circuit; we ought to straighten it out, and determine which
of the two is correct. Rather, we have to look at the Federal Circuit's product in
isolation and guess whether it smells bad. There is no other basis on which to grant
certiorari. Howard did not view that absence of extensive Supreme Court review as
liberating but rather as a problem-as another factor which demanded careful
attention to all of the cases brought before the Federal Circuit. 13
So, Chief Judge Markey set out to define the new court's mission and achieve
success. He recognized that a key goal of the newly created circuit was the
development of a unified body of law in the substantive areas entrusted to its
exclusive jurisdiction, so he set out to achieve that uniformity. 14 He identified over a
dozen conflicts that had infected the administration of patent law in the Regional
Circuits, and within three years his court had resolved all of them. 15 Together with
his colleagues, he established a procedure subjecting every judge's opinion to review
by the full court to assure uniformity within the court's decisions. 16 I'm not sure how
long that has lasted by the way, but it was that way under Markey. He did this
because he recognized that consistent and proper administration of the law takes
17
precedence over pride of authorship.
He also recognized that "justice delayed is justice denied."' 8 As Chief Judge of
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, he had reduced the time from filing to

lead to a proliferation of federal specialty courts and will not solve the problems it
is designed to address in the patent system.
Id.
10 See Howard T. Markey, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Challenge and
Opportunity, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 595, 599 (1985) ("The new court [Federal Circuit] must reach its
decisions in its exclusive areas with a care occasioned by its inability to look to other courts for
differing views.").
11Markey, supra note 8, at 578 ("The Federal Circuit also recognized the special responsibility

placed on it as the probable court of last resort in most of its cases.").
12 See

SUP. CT. R. 10(a).
Markey, supra note 8, at 578.
14 Id. at 577 ("[The Federal Circuit set out to meet Congress' express intent that it contribute
to increased uniformity and reliability in the fields of national law assigned.").
15 Id. ("In its first three years, for example, [the Federal Circuit] identified and resolved all of
the thirteen conflicts in the previous patent law decisions of the regional circuit courts.").
13 See

16 Id.

at 578.

17Id.
18 Howard

T. Markey, The State of the Court, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1093, 1094 (1989)
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decision to a mere seven months, 19 a remarkable achievement given that five of those
seven months are consumed by the parties' briefing. 2° He maintained that record as
Chief of the Federal Circuit, 2 1 and he did this without compromising the quality of
the court's work, adhering to the court's mission of producing what he called, "The
22
Best Possible Decisions in the Shortest Possible Time at the Least Possible Cost."
Howard recalled the fundamental constitutional principles that our federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the scope of their power being defined by the
Congress. 23 And so upon his departure from the bench, he proudly recalled his
efforts to adhere faithfully to the congressionally expressed expectation that the
24
Federal Circuit would not attempt to unduly restrict or expand its own jurisdiction.
Perhaps most importantly, Chief Judge Markey recognized, and in his own
eloquent words pronounced, that, "[t]o best serve its critical role in a free society, the
law must be understandable, uniform, reliable, and consistent with the intent of the
people's representatives who enacted it."25 So Howard set out crafting an immense
body of work known for its careful reasoning, thorough research, and clear - indeed
some might say blunt - prose.

In a now famous line of cases, Judge Markey set out to refute the notion that socalled combination patents were a different beast requiring a different level of
judicial scrutiny. 26 He spoke firmly, noting that virtually all claimed inventions are
combinations of old elements, that the Supreme Court had long recognized the
patentability of combinations of old elements, and that the text of the patent law
provided no basis for distinguishing one class of patents from another. 27 In a follow19Cohn, supra note 1, at 9.
20 See Markey, supra note 18, at 1093-94.
21

Id

22

Id. at 1094.
Williams v. Secretary of the Navy, 787 F.2d 552, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Markey, C.J.)

23

("[F]ederal courts are of limited jurisdiction, and may not alter the scope of either their own or
another courts' statutory mandate.").
24 See Markey, supra note 8, at 578.
25 See id. at 579.
26 Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 730 F.2d 1476, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Markey, C.J.)
("There is no separate classification of 'combination patents' and no basis for considering claims to
combinations of elements differently from any other."); Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc.,
721 F.2d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Markey, C.J.) ("There is neither a statutory distinction
between 'combination patents' and some other, never defined type of patent, nor a reason to treat
the conditions for patentability differently with respect to 'combination patents'. [sic] It but
obfuscates the law to posit a non-statutory, judge-created classification labeled 'combination
patents'." [sic]); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Markey, C.J.)
("There is no classification [in the patent statute] entitled 'combination patents."'); Stratoflex, Inc. v.
Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Markey, C.J.) ("The reference to a
'combination patent' is ... without support in the statute.").
27 See Amstar, 730 F.2d at 1483 (noting that there is no distinction among patents in the
patent statute); Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Markey, C.J.)
(citing United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51-52 (1966)) (noting the Supreme Court's recognition
that combinations of old elements are patentable); Medtronic,721 F.2d at 1566 (noting that there is
no distinction among patents in the patent statute); Connell, 722 F.2d at 1548 (noting that there is
no distinction among patents in the patent statute); Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1540.
There is no warrant for judicial classifications of patents, whether into
'combination' patents and some other unnamed and undefined class or otherwise.
Nor is there warrant for differing treatment or consideration of patents based on a
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up case he stepped up his rhetoric, calling the distinction "simplistically unrealistic,"
28
and sharply criticizing any such distinction not rooted in the text of the patent act.
Finally, his point having been made, he was content in the subsequent opinion to say
simply that the "Patent Act provides no basis for any separate 'combination patent'
29
classification."
In remarks reflecting on the early years of the Federal Circuit, Judge William
Conner, a judge on the Southern District of New York, recalled the excitement and
fear these opinions generated as the patent bar waited to see the Supreme Court's
reaction to Judge Markey's sometimes provocative opinions. 30 But those opinions
stood, and Judge Markey achieved his goal, as he put it, of "remov[ing] the slogans
31
that for years had barnacled the patent law."
In a related and perhaps equally notable set of early opinions, Judge Markey
criticized the synergism requirement that some courts had used as a test for
patentability. 32 Here again, he demonstrated a commitment to statutory text, sound
reasoning, and clear and colorful writing. He wrote in a case early in his tenure that
the "requirement that an invention reflect 'synergism'. . . appears nowhere in the
statute" and that "[r]eferences to synergism as a patentability requirement are,
therefore, unnecessary and confusing." 33 In another case not long after, he referred
to the requirement simply as "non-existent."34 This was all something of a novelty to
the patent bar.35 He made much the same point no fewer than six times in the

judicially devised label. Reference to 'combination' patents is, moreover,
meaningless. Virtually all patents are 'combination patents,' if by that label one
intends to describe patents having claims to inventions formed of a combination of
elements. It is difficult to visualize, at least in the mechanical-structural arts, a
'non-combination' invention, i.e., an invention consisting of a single element.
Id.
28 Raytheon, 724 F.2d at 961 ("It is ...simplistically unrealistic to employ a separate test of
patentability for combinations of old elements when the language of the 1952 Patent Act provides no
basis for either classifying patents into different 'types' or for applying different treatment to
different 'types' of patents.").
29 Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 776 F. 2d 309, 317 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
30 William C. Conner, Speech at the 75th Annual Dinner of the NYIPLA-March 21, 1997, 6
FED. CIR. B.J. 363, 369 (1996) ("In a series of decisions written by Chief Judge Markey, the [Federal
Circuit] expressly and brazenly rejected many of the principles of patent law which the Supreme
Court had promulgated ....Because all of those decisions were subject to review by the Supreme
Court, the patent bar waited with trembling dread for their ax to fall. It never did.").
31 See Markey, supra note 8, at 577.
32 See, e.g., Connell, 722 F.2d at 1549 ("Virtually every invention is a combination of elements
or process steps, and synergism, or its equivalent 'new and different result,' is not requiredfor
patentability."); Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 781 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(Markey, C.J.).
33 Chore-Time, 713 F.2d at 781.
34 Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Markey, C.J.) ("The 'effect
greater' language is but a longer statement of a non-existent requirement for 'synergism'." (citation
omitted)).
35See, e.g., Robert W. Harris, Prospects for Supreme Court Review of the Federal Circuit
Standards for Obviousness of Inventions Combining Old Elements, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 66, 71-72 (1986) ("As to synergism or unexpected results, the [Federal Circuit] takes the most
pro-patent position possible: neither synergism nor unexpected results is required to establish
nonobviousness ....
").
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Court's first three years. 36 This too was part of the task of establishing a new court
whose authority was still in doubt. It was not long before Judge Markey put those
doubts to rest.
Ultimately these opinions reflected Markey's adherence to the principle that, as
he put it, "Judges are not constitutionally empowered to legislate their individual
subjective views respecting degrees of inventiveness ....What is required to uphold
[the] validity of a patent.., is what Congress ...has said is required." 37 Words to
live by, in and out of the patent context. Judge Markey understood that the
credibility of judges and the legitimacy of the courts depend on their ability to
38
articulate clear principles of law consistent with the statutes enacted by Congress.
Howard was also a practical man and a practical judge who understood the
formative role he would play in the development of the law - patent law in
particular. He knew that members of the bar, called upon by their clients to give
reliable advice, depended on the clarity, consistency, and completeness of his court's
39
opinions, and he was intent on delivering.
In its infancy, the Federal Circuit produced an immense body of learned
opinions, and no one more than Judge Markey deserves credit for that effort. He led
his court in articulating the foundational principles of patent law, and he is for that
reason universally acknowledged as one of the forefathers of modern patent law, an
area of law now densely populated by academics and practitioners, with entire
departments at our leading universities and law firms dedicated to the subject. That
was not the case when Howard Markey first started the Federal Circuit. It was
through the strength of his opinions and the force of his leadership that Chief Judge
Markey earned his designation as the John Marshall of the Federal Circuit.
But Howard's contributions to the law, as Chairman Cohn will affirm, were not
limited to his pronouncements from the bench. In a series of influential articles and
speeches, Howard explored the often troubled relationship between technology and
the law. 40 He was skeptical of the notion that science and technology could answer
our legal quandaries. 41 But Howard was no Luddite. He saw a proper role for
technology in the judicial process and he advised his fellow judges not to fear
technology or treat it as something alien to the law. 42 "Technology is in the court and
is likely to stay there," he said. "It cannot be shunned. But it can be welcomed by
judges made happier by the welcoming." 43 As a lawyer and a judge steeped in those
36 See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F. 2d 1082, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Markey,
C.J.); Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 730 F.2d 1476, 1479 & n. 4 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Markey, C.J.);
Connell, 722 F.2d at 1549; Kansas Jack, 719 F.2d at 1150; Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713
F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Markey, C.J.); Chore-Time, 713 F.2d at 781.
37Jones v. Hardy, 727 F. 2d 1524, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
38 See Markey, supra note 8, at 579.
39See Markey, supra note 10, at 595 ("The challenge to the court and its bar is to create and
maintain a uniform, reliable, predictable, nationally-applicable body of law in each of the many and
varied fields of substantive law assigned exclusively to the court.").
40 See, e.g., Howard T. Markey, Jurisprudenceor "Juriscience'?,25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 525
(1984).
41Id. at 526.
42Id. ("Science and law, however, need not be mutually exclusive. Both should serve society.
They should complement each other, rather than conflict.").
43 Howard T. Markey, JudicialAssessment of Technology: Star Wars or Stare Decisis2 Speech
to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Feb. 13, 1978, reprintedin 2 HOWARD
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fields closest to the intersection of law and technology, Howard was an able guide to
his fellow judges encountering for the first time the issues presented by new-fangled
technologies, inscrutable experts, and complex assessments of risk and benefit.
Howard was also a keen observer and critic of the judiciary in general. In a
lecture delivered at the University of South Dakota School of Law, he lamented the
deterioration of the federal appellate process. 44 Courts burdened with ever-growing
caseloads; judges unable to devote the time necessary to consider and properly
resolve cases; a system that by virtue of necessity had been focused on, as he put it,
"'getting the cases out'-not on personal scholarship, memorable elucidation, or clear,
forward thinking."45 Courts, he feared, had become factories, the title of judge had
become debased, the compensation of judges greatly diminished, the dockets crowded
with too much chaff obscuring too little wheat. 46 He recalled a time not too long ago
when judging was a judicial process.4 7 Judges would review the briefs and the
record, listen to oral argument, and prepare written opinions in consultation with
their colleagues and with the limited assistance of a single law clerk.48 He decried
the transformation of judging into a bureaucratic process in which cases are triaged
by a core of staff attorneys, oral argument is rare and brief, judicial conference is
infrequent and short, and over two-thirds of the cases are disposed of without
49
opinion.
Howard was neither the first nor the last judge to express these sentiments, and
he was not one to engage in excessive navel gazing. He once wrote-this is vividly
put-that to "take time away from the constant flood of appeals" to reflect upon the
state of the courts, "could visit upon the judges a disaster not unlike that suffered by
the twentieth floor window washer who stepped back to view the results of
his ... labor."5 0 But his observations and criticisms are well taken and are as
relevant today as they were twenty years ago when he first made them. The only
thing that has changed is that we no longer have Howard Markey around to draw
attention to the problems with his signature eloquence and pith.
At the end of his career, after retiring from the bench, Howard of course became
an academic-to the extent that law school deans can be considered academics (deans
will know what I mean).51 He served as dean of this law school, where, as I
mentioned, he had been a student more than forty years earlier.5 2 That was typical
of Howard. He knew who he was and where he came from and never wavered in his
loyalty to the institutions that had formed him - from his Nation to his law school.
And I have not even mentioned what Howard had accomplished before coming to
the law. Howard Markey was a patriot and a warrior, serving in the Air Force in

T. MARKEY

ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A

COMPILATION OF His WRITINGS, OPINIONS,

AND

SPEECHES 1767, 1772 (1998).
44 Howard T. Markey, On the Present Deteriorationof the FederalAppellate Process: Never
Another LearnedHand,33 S.D. L. REV. 371 (1988).
45 Id. at 373.
46 Id. at 374-76.
47 Id. at 373.
48 Id. at 376.
49 Id. at 377.

See Markey, supra note 18, at 1095.
Cohn, supra note 1, at 11.
52 Id. at 9, 11.
50
51
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both World War II and the Korean War, and flying combat missions in the latter. 53
He was awarded, among other things, the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of
Merit, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Soldier's Medal, the Purple Heart, the Air
Medal, and the Bronze Star.5 4 He was a Brigadier General at the age of 38 and
55
commanded the Illinois Air National Guard for 12 years.
It is hard to say which of these multiple careers Howard Markey enjoyed the
most. I suspect it was a toss-up between the Air Force and his service on the bench.
One of his online biographies claims that in his sad last days at a nursing home, he
asked the staff to address him as Judge and General on alternate days. 56 I wouldn't
be surprised.
I remember visiting Howard's office when he was chief of the Federal Circuit, a
splendid office overlooking Lafayette Park and the White House. Proudly hanging
there was a memento of his youthful days as a famous test pilot for the new jet
engines. He flew with Chuck Yeager, the first man to break the sound barrier. 57 The
memento was a blow-up of one of the boxes from a Dick Tracy comic strip. That strip,
the older ones among you may recall, had a character called Diet Smith, an
industrialist who developed a lot of cutting-edge technology equipment for Tracy's
police force-things that seemed phenomenal in those days, like the wrist-radio and a
vehicle to go to the moon. And in the installment of the strip enlarged on Howard's
wall, Diet Smith announces that his new engine is ready for testing and he directs
his staff to "SEND FOR MARKEY."58 That's how well known he was, and Howard
was proud of that.
In addition to all I have described above, Howard was active-the operative
word for Howard was always active-in all sorts of civic and professional causes. He
was one of the moving forces in the foundation and spread of the American Inns of
Court.5 9 He founded the Thomas More Society of America. 60 And through it allover it all, one might say-he was a devoted husband to his wife of 52 years,
Elizabeth, whom he married when he was 21, and who predeceased him, and a loving
6 1
father to their children, Jeffrey, Christopher, and Jennifer.
To tell the truth, I think Howard Markey would be bemused at a symposium
dedicated to the legacy of Howard Markey. I think Howard would likely say legacies
are things for ex-Presidents and politicians.
You might talk about my
accomplishments, he would say, but legacies are enduring. And, sad as it is to
contemplate, the Federal Circuit, even The John Marshall Law School, one day will
be no longer. And the United States Patent Law that I elucidated and developed will
one day be as antiquated as estates in land. What endures is the human spirit, and
53Id
at
8-9;
Death
Claims
AIC
Founder Judge
Howard
T.
Markey,
http ://www.innsofcourt.org/Content/Default.aspx?ID=1646
54 Howard Thomas Markey, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdMARKEY.pdf (last visited Mar.
27, 2009).
55Id.
56 Howard Thomas Markey, Major General, United States Air Force, Federal Judge,
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/htmarkey.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
57Chuck Yeager & Leo Janos, The Sound Barrier,in THE GREATEST FLYING STORIES EVER
TOLD 43, 43 (Lamar Underwood ed., 2004).
58 Chester Gould, Dick Tracy, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 1966, § 1B, at 18.
59Cohn, supra note 1, at 10-11.
60 Id. at 10.
61 Id. at 7, 9, 11-12.
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if I have any legacy, anything that really endures, it is in the preserving and passingon of that spirit.
I say much the same thing to law faculties when I have the occasion to speak to
them at faculty lunches. They are obsessed with publishing. They think this is going
to be their mark on the law, their legacy. I tell them how foolish that is. The shelflife of the great American law review article is about five years, and of the great
American treatise maybe 25; after that, they're just of historical interest. What
endures is what happens in the classroom. I still have people come up to me who
were my students at the University of Virginia, in the 1970s for Pete's sake, who are
full of gratitude and say, you know, I was in your contracts class and you lit a spark
in me for the love of the law and I never lost it. Some of those people have passed it
on to others. So I tell the law professors, that's where you make your mark. That's
where your legacy will be, in passing on your spirit of the law to others who will pass
it on once again.
The best in the human spirit that existed in Howard Markey was, I think,
represented by the man whom I'm sure he studied in the course of his Catholic
62
education, Virgil's Aeneas.
The epithet that Virgil always used for Aeneas was
"pius," Pius Aeneas.6 3 We get the English word pious from it,64 but pious doesn't bear
the meaning that pius had in Latin. It meant dutiful-aware of and devoted to one's
duty.6 5 Well, you could say it was Pius Markey observing his duty to God, to family,
to country and to community. And I think he would say that his legacy was the
passing on of that virtue the way we all pass on such things-through the children
we raise, through the law clerks to whom we are mentors, and through the friends
and associates who observe the course of our life. And the course of Howard
Markey's life was truly remarkable.
So, as I said, I don't know much about patent law. But I know much about the
human spirit, and that to me is Howard Markey's legacy.
Thank you.

62 See VIRGIL, THE AENEID OF VIRGIL (Edgar S. Shumway ed., John Conington trans.,
MacMillan Co. 1917) (1910).

63 See id.at 178.
64
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1869 (2d ed. 1957).
65 Jd

